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Raj Bhala argues that the Doha Round is “a failed counter-insurgency
operation.” This paper examines and criticizes that claim. The first part
examines the traditional “peace through trade” thesis that traces back to
the Enlightenment and discusses contemporary formulations and
evaluations of that broad thesis. The second part focuses on Bhala’s related
“counter-terrorism through trade” thesis. Three questions are raised:
First, what exactly is Bhala claiming? Second, is Bhala’s thesis a solution
in search of a problem? And most importantly, third, does poverty cause
(Islamist) terrorism? In connection with the third question, the paper
surveys the current social science literature on the subject. The paper finds
that there is a broad consensus across disciplines that the link between
poverty and terrorism is unproven and perhaps non-existent. Thus, Bhala’s
defense of Doha fails. While there may be strong arguments in equity or
efficiency for adopting Doha, it is a mistake to advocate it as effective
counter-terrorist policy.
Does freer trade promote counter-terrorism? Professor Bhala thinks so.
On that basis, he argues that the 2001 Doha Round should be adopted.
Bhala’s thesis, in a nutshell, is that “the Doha Round is a failed counter-
1. Associate Professor of Law, University of St. Thomas School of Law. I would like to
thank Thomas C. Berg and John C. Yoo for their very helpful comments, and Captain Christopher
Motz USMCR, my Research Assistant, for his excellent work.
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insurgency operation.”2 Bhala draws links between the growth of
international trade and wealth creation and between poverty and terrorism.
Broadly, his argument is that more trade with the Muslim world will bring
it greater affluence, that greater affluence will relieve its poverty, that
poverty causes Islamist terrorism, and so that growing wealth in the Muslim
world will prevent or reduce such terrorism. But that restatement of the
argument somewhat oversimplifies it. So let me use Bhala’s own
formulation, which is more nuanced in describing the causal connection that
he sees between terrorism and poverty:
The link is not adamantine. The precise causal connection is not
entirely clear. But, the basic connection is obvious enough, both
self-evident and clear from observed experience: poverty, in the
narrow sense of a lack of income, or an even broader sense of
oppression, connotes a lack of status as a stakeholder in the global
trading system. Put succinctly, marginalization, which is a hall-
mark of poverty, is a contributory factor in vulnerability to violent
religious fanaticism. Conversely, a world trading system in which
a person finds opportunity through decently-paying jobs, and
thereby hope for the socioeconomic advancement of himself and
his family, is one—but by no means the only—way to offer the
status of stakeholder. Concomitant with that status is the opportu-
nity for better education and health care, both of which, along
with a reduction in income poverty, give a person a rational basis
for hope in the system.3
Bhala is careful to say that “neither underdevelopment nor poverty is a
necessary or sufficient condition for Islamist extremism.”4 Nevertheless, he
insists that “neither can they be ignored. They are repeatedly observed phe-
nomena connected with this extremism.”5
Bhala’s argument has a highly respectable intellectual pedigree. It is a
variation of the traditional “peace through trade” argument that classical
liberals like Montesquieu, Hume, Adam Smith and many of their successors
have made since the eighteenth century. In Part I of what follows, I will
discuss the origins of the classical “peace through trade” thesis and its
standing in contemporary international relations theory. To the extent that
the “peace though trade” thesis seems established, that fact will tend to
support Bhala’s views; to the extent that the thesis is problematic, however,
Bhala cannot draw comfort from that source. In Part II, I will focus on
Bhala’s specific variation of the “peace through trade” thesis, which chiefly
2. Raj Bhala, Poverty, Islamist Extremism, and the Debacle of Doha Round Counter-
Terrorism: Part One of a Trilogy—Agricultural Tariffs and Subsidies, 9 U. ST. THOMAS L.J. 5, 9
(2012) (emphasis in original).
3. Id. at 16.
4. Id. at 26.
5. Id.
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concerns non-state, transnational, Islamist terrorism rather than interna-
tional war or militarized disputes.
In evaluating Bhala’s thesis, I will raise three questions. First, how
exactly should his thesis be understood? Second, has the problem to which
his thesis is addressed—violent Islamist radicalism—been largely solved
already? And third, assuming that that problem has not been solved, is the
Doha Round likely to be a cure for it?
Bhala’s thesis is attractive, not least because Islam as a faith and Is-
lamdom as a civilization have historically been very favorable to trade. The
Koranic conception of God has been said to be based on “the ideal
merchant.”6 And Islamic tradition has often praised merchants.7 Indeed,
Mohammed himself was a merchant8 and lived in a trading milieu.9 Even
though Islamic civilization has long been hospitable to trade, however, it
hardly follows that expanded trade will remedy the radical Islamist violence
of the present.10 In what follows, I will argue that the belief that trade will
have such benign effects is not justified.
I. THE “PEACE THROUGH TRADE” THESIS
A. The Origins
The eighteenth century Enlightenment witnessed what the philosopher
Charles Taylor has described as the beginning of a fundamental change in
Western society’s “social imaginary.” One important aspect of that change,
Taylor writes, was “the gradual promotion of the economic to [the] central
place” it occupies in modern thought.11 More specifically, leading thinkers
6. MAXIME RODINSON, ISLAM AND CAPITALISM 81 (Brian Pearce trans., 1973) (quoting
CHARLES C. TORREY, THE COMMERCIAL-THEOLOGICAL TERMS IN THE KORAN (1892)).
7. Id. at 17 (“It is reported that the Prophet said: ‘The merchant who is sincere and trustwor-
thy will (at the Judgement Day) be among the prophets, the just and the martyrs’, . . . or:
‘Merchants are the messengers of this world and God’s faithful trustees on Earth.’ According to
holy tradition, trade is a superior way of earning one’s livelihood: ‘If thou profit by doing what is
permitted, thy deed is a djihad [that is, identified with holy war or any vigorous effort undertaken
for God’s cause] and, if thou usest it for thy family and kindred, this will be a sadaqa [that is, a
pious work of charity]; and, truly, a dirham [drachma, silver coin] lawfully gained from trade is
worth more than ten dirhams gained in any other way.’ The taste for business that was characteris-
tic of the Prophet and of the holy Caliphs, his first successors, was reported with tenderness. Umar
is alleged to have said: ‘Death can come upon me nowhere more pleasantly than where I am
engaged in business in the market, buying and selling on behalf of my family.’”).
8. See, e.g., HANS K ¨UNG, ISLAM: PAST, PRESENT & FUTURE 96 (John Bowden trans., 2007).
9. See, e.g., Mahmood Ibrahim, Social and Economic Conditions in Pre-Islamic Mecca, 14
INT’L J. MIDDLE E. STUD. 343, 343 (1982). But scholars have cautioned against overemphasizing
the role of Meccan trade in accounting for the origins of Islam. See PATRICIA CRONE, MECCAN
TRADE AND THE RISE OF ISLAM (1987).
10. More generally, in his searching analysis of contemporary Islamic civilization, Ali Al-
lawi argues that Islam’s traditional emphasis on a “moral economy” predisposes it against certain
features of globalization. See ALI A. ALLAWI, THE CRISIS OF ISLAMIC CIVILIZATION 206–28
(2009).
11. Charles Taylor, Modern Social Imaginaries, 14 PUB. CULTURE 91, 104 (2002).
\\jciprod01\productn\U\UST\9-1\UST103.txt unknown Seq: 4 28-SEP-12 10:52
164 UNIVERSITY OF ST. THOMAS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 9:1
of the Enlightenment, especially in Scotland but also in France, Germany,
and the United States, began to consider commerce as the source of many
benefits, including international peace. Taylor writes:
The notion that economic activity is the path to peace and orderly
existence gains more widespread acceptance. Le doux commerce
[gentle commerce] is contrasted with the wild destructiveness of
the aristocratic search for military glory. The more a society turns
to commerce, the more “polished” and civilized it becomes, the
more it excels in the arts of peace. The impetus to make money is
seen as a “calm passion.” When it takes hold in a society, it can
help to control and inhibit the violent passions. Or put in other
language, money-making serves our “interest,” and interest can
check and control passion. Kant even believed that as nations be-
come republics, and hence more under the control of their ordi-
nary, economic-minded taxpayers, recourse to war will become
rarer and rarer.12
As Taylor’s summary suggests, the idea of le doux commerce encapsu-
lates three distinguishable claims.13 The first concerns individuals: it holds
that the rise of commerce will modify relations between individuals by in-
stilling a particular set of virtues and by inducing particular habits in our
dealings with one another, including probity, moderation, prudence, self-
restraint, and an aversion to violence. The second claim concerns domestic
political and constitutional relationships between states and their subjects
or citizens: the classes engaged in commercial activity will gain power and
standing in relation to the non-commercial aristocracy and will use that
power to introduce more “republican” forms of government. The final claim
is a claim about international relations: that foreign trade will tend to pro-
duce peace between nations that are trading partners. These three claims
correspond to the “three levels” of explanatory “images” in international
relations theory that Kenneth Waltz famously identified, viz., first, the indi-
vidual level; second, the state or domestic level; and third, the level of the
international system of states.14
12. Id. Credit for rediscovering the importance of le doux commerce as a motif of Enlighten-
ment though goes to the economist Albert O. Hirschman. See ALBERT O. HIRSCHMAN, THE PAS-
SIONS AND THE INTERESTS: POLITICAL ARGUMENTS FOR CAPITALISM BEFORE ITS TRIUMPH 56–63
(1977); Albert O. Hirschman, Rival Interpretations of Market Society: Civilizing, Destructive, or
Feeble?, 20 J. ECON. LITERATURE 1463, 1464–66 (1982). Some thinkers of the Enlightenment and
its immediate aftermath—including James Madison—had far more pessimistic views of the “eter-
nal empire of commerce.” See Emma Rothschild, Language and Empire, c. 1800, 78 HIST. RES.
208, 213–17 (2005).
13. These three claims correspond to the “three levels” of “images” famously identified by
Kenneth Waltz in MAN, THE STATE, AND WAR: A THEORETICAL ANALYSIS (1954), viz., the indi-
vidual, the state, and the international system of states.
14. KENNETH WALTZ, MAN, THE STATE, AND WAR: A THEORETICAL ANALYSIS (1954).
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The three claims are interrelated in various ways. Thus, the eighteenth
century Anglo-American writer Thomas Paine connected all three claims
when he said that commerce:
[I]s a pacific system, operating to cordialise mankind, by render-
ing nations, as well as individuals, useful to each other. . . . If
commerce were permitted to act to the universal extent it is capa-
ble, it would extirpate the system of war, and produce a revolu-
tion in the uncivilized state of governments.15
Of the three claims, the most relevant here is that which concerns in-
ternational relations: the “peace through trade” thesis.16 Throughout the
nineteenth century, classical liberals developed and refined that thesis.
Thus, the French economist Fre´de´ric Bastiat argued in 1845 that the inter-
dependency of nations that engage in trade discourages them from going to
war and even from undertaking armaments programs:
If nations remain permanently in the world market; if their inter-
relations cannot be broken without their peoples’ suffering the
double discomfort of privation and glut; they will no longer need
the mighty navies that bankrupt them or the vast armies that
weigh them down; the peace of the world will not be jeopardized
by the caprice of a Thiers [a French statesman, opponent of free
trade and advocate of an anti-British policy] or a Palmerston
[British Foreign Secretary, hostile to France].17
The nineteenth century British parliamentarian and liberal thinker
Richard Cobden also extolled the benefits of trade, arguing that free trade
would eventually lead to world peace. In a speech he delivered in
Manchester in 1846, Cobden said:
I see in the Free-trade principle that which shall act on the moral
world as the principle of gravitation in the universe,—drawing
men together, thrusting aside the antagonism of race, and creed,
and language, and uniting us in the bonds of eternal peace. I have
looked even farther. I have speculated, and probably dreamt, in
the dim future—ay, a thousand years hence—I have speculated
on what the effect of the triumph of this principle may be. I be-
lieve that the effect will be to change the face of the world, so as
15. 2 THOMAS PAINE, RIGHTS OF MAN: PART SECOND, COMBINING PRINCIPLE AND PRACTICE
(1772), reprinted in THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS PAINE 390, 456 (Moncure Daniel Conway ed.,
1894), available at files.libertyfund.org/files/ 344/0548-02_Bk.pdf.
16. See MICHAEL HOWARD, WAR AND THE LIBERAL CONSCIENCE 31 (1978) (“By the end of
the eighteenth century a complete liberal theory of international relations, of war and peace,
had . . . already developed.”).
The “peace through trade” thesis is related to another “liberal peace” thesis—that democra-
cies tend not to go to war with each other. For a discussion of the “democratic peace” thesis and a
review of the literature on it, see Robert J. Delahunty & John Yoo, Kant, Habermas and Demo-
cratic Peace, 10 CHI. J. INT’L L. 437 (2010).
17. FR ´ED ´ERIC BASTIAT, ECONOMIC SOPHISMS 99 (Arthur Goddard ed. & trans., Found. for
Econ. Educ. 1996) (1845), available at files.libertyfund.org/files/276/0182_Bk.pdf.
\\jciprod01\productn\U\UST\9-1\UST103.txt unknown Seq: 6 28-SEP-12 10:52
166 UNIVERSITY OF ST. THOMAS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 9:1
to introduce a system of government entirely distinct from that
which now prevails. I believe that the desire and the motive for
large and mighty empires; for gigantic armies and great navies—
for those materials which are used for the destruction of life and
the desolation of the rewards of labour—will die away; I believe
that such things will cease to be necessary, or to be used, when
man becomes one family, and freely exchanges the fruits of his
labour with his brother man.18
The English philosopher, economist, and parliamentarian John Stuart
Mill also endorsed the thesis. In his Principles of Political Economy (1848),
Mill contended that the expansion of foreign trade had not only direct, eco-
nomic advantages for the trading nations but also indirect benefits, includ-
ing the promotion of peace:
Commerce first taught nations to see with good will the wealth
and prosperity of one another. Before, the patriot, unless suffi-
ciently advanced in culture to feel the world his country, wished
all countries weak, poor, and ill-governed, but his own: he now
sees in their wealth and progress a direct source of wealth and
progress to his own country. It is commerce which is rapidly ren-
dering war obsolete, by strengthening and multiplying the per-
sonal interests which are in natural opposition to it. And it may be
said without exaggeration that the great extent and rapid increase
of international trade, in being the principal guarantee of the
peace of the world, is the great permanent security for the uninter-
rupted progress of the ideas, the institutions, and the character of
the human race.19
The “peace through trade” thesis flourished in the nineteenth century.
As the historian Geoffrey Blainey has noted, “[t]he long peace that fol-
lowed the Battle of Waterloo was increasingly explained as the result of the
international flow of commodities and ideas.”20 But the thesis suffered a
serious blow with the outbreak of the First World War. As critics of the
thesis have argued since then, that war (along with other conflicts) seems to
provide a clear refutation of it. “High levels of economic integration did not
prevent World War I, and nations that were . . . unified . . . have peacefully
dissolved or fought civil wars.”21 Indeed, one might plausibly argue that the
18. Richard Cobden, Free Trade. XX. (Jan. 15, 1846), in 1 SPEECHES ON QUESTIONS OF
PUBLIC POLICY BY RICHARD COBDEN, M.P. 181, 187 (John Bright & J.E. Thorold Rogers eds., 3d
ed. 1908).
19. JOHN STUART MILL, PRINCIPLES OF POLITICAL ECONOMY WITH SOME OF THEIR APPLICA-
TIONS TO SOCIAL PHILOSOPHY 582 (W. J. Ashley ed., 1915) (emphasis added).
20. GEOFFREY BLAINEY, THE CAUSES OF WAR 18 (1973).
21. Robert Jervis, Theories of War in an Era of Leading-Power Peace, 96 AM. POL. SCI.
REV. 1, 6 (2002); see also Dale C. Copeland, Economic Interdependence and War: A Theory of
Trade Expectations, 20 INT’L SEC. 5, 6 (1996); Jack S. Levy, War and Peace, in HANDBOOK OF
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 350, 358 (Walter Carlsnaes, Thomas Risse & Beth A. Simmons eds.,
2002).
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high level of interdependence provoked the First World War as Germany,
fearful that other nations’ protectionism would close off their markets to its
finished products or that vital food and commodity imports from them
would be denied to it, went to war in order to prevent such outcomes.22
Recent analysis, however, has questioned whether the First World War
truly does provide decisive evidence against the “peace through trade”
thesis.23
By contrast, the Second World War was widely understood to have
resulted from the neo-mercantilist, trade-restrictive policies that the major
nations pursued during the inter-war period. Prominent decision-makers
like Cordell Hull, who served from 1933 to 1944 as President Franklin
Roosevelt’s Secretary of State, firmly believed that liberalized trading rules
would promote peace. Hull made the pursuit of open markets a centerpiece
of American foreign policy. In his memoirs, he wrote that even early in his
political career:
I saw that you could not separate the idea of commerce from the
idea of war and peace . . . [and] that wars were often largely
caused by economic rivalry conducted unfairly . . . . [T]o me,
unhampered trade dovetailed with peace; high tariffs, trade barri-
ers, and unfair economic competition, with war.24
Hull’s decades of efforts culminated in the post-Second World War
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT).
Ironically, however, just as some later scholarship has denied that the
outbreak of the First World War contradicts the “peace through trade” the-
sis, so later scholars have challenged the views that the Second World War
was caused by neo-mercantilism and that the “Long Peace” after 1945 was
due primarily to the liberal global trading patterns of that period.25
B. Contemporary Liberal Theory and its Critics
Recent years have seen a renewal of interest in the liberal “peace
through trade” thesis. There are in fact several distinct positions in the con-
temporary restatements,26 but the core of the contemporary (third-level)
22. See generally KENNETH N. WALTZ, The Myth of National Interdependence, in REALISM
AND INTERNATIONAL POLITICS 152 (2008).
23. See Patrick McDonald, Peace Through Trade or Free Trade?, 48 J. CONFLICT RESOL.
547, 569 (2004).
24. DOUGLAS A. IRWIN, TRADE LIBERALIZATION: CORDELL HULL AND THE CASE FOR OPTI-
MISM 5 (2008).
25. See Barry Buzan, Economic Structure and International Security: The Limits of the Lib-
eral Case, 38 INT’L ORG. 597, 599–601 (1984).
26. For synopses of a variety of liberal arguments affirming that trade leads to peace, see
Cullen F. Goenner, Uncertainty of the Liberal Peace, 41 J. PEACE RES. 589, 590 (2004); Levy,
supra note 21, at 356–58; Copeland, supra note 21, at 8 n.2. For useful surveys of the literature on
the influence of trade, see Erik Gartzke, Quan Li & Charles Boehmer, Investing in the Peace:
Economic Interdependence and International Conflict, 55 INT’L ORG. 391, 393–96 (2001); Susan
McMillan, Interdependence and Conflict, 41 MERSHON INT’L STUD. REV. 33 (1997).
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thesis is that because trade provides valuable gains to states, states should
seek to avoid war (especially with their trading partners) because peaceful
trading will give them essentially all the benefits they want from other
states without the costs and risks of war. For some liberal theorists, the most
important of these costs are the losses incident to the interruption of trade
during a conflict—the “opportunity costs” of war.27 Other liberal theorists
emphasize instead that war entails loss of life, destruction of property,
heavy expenditures, and the chance of defeat.28 The risk of such losses may
outweigh any prospective gains from victory. Furthermore, even if the out-
come of a war is successful, the occupation of a conquered territory and the
pacification of its inhabitants (as the United States found in Iraq) is often
sufficiently burdensome as to prevent a military victory from being profita-
bly exploited. Finally, developing rational choice theories of war and
peace,29 some liberal theorists suggest that trade flows may have a “signal-
ing” function that provides an accurate and observable measure of a na-
Influential presentations of the “peace through trade” thesis include John R. Oneal & Bruce
Russett, Clear and Clean: The Fixed Effects of the Liberal Peace, 55 INT’L ORG. 469 (2001); John
R. Oneal & Bruce Russett, The Kantian Peace: The Pacific Benefits of Democracy, Interdepen-
dence, and International Organizations, 1885–1992, 52 WORLD POL. 1 (1999); John R. Oneal &
Bruce M. Russett, The Classical Liberals Were Right: Democracy, Interdependence, and Conflict,
1950–1985, 41 INT’L STUD. Q. 267 (1997) [hereinafter Oneal & Russett, The Classical Liberals];
and Solomon W. Polachek, Conflict and Trade, 24 J. CONFLICT RESOL. 55, 56, 60 (1980). A
strong recent reaffirmation of the thesis based on empirical research is Zeev Maoz, The Effects of
Strategic and Economic Interdependence on International Conflict Across Levels of Analysis, 53
AM. J. POL. SCI. 223, 234 (2009) (“The dampening impact of economic interdependence on con-
flict at the monadic, dyadic, and systemic level is robust and significant. This is so regardless of
the data used to measure economic interdependence, and regardless of the method used to treat
missing data.”).
27. See Gartzke, Li & Boehmer, supra note 26, at 394 (“The central logic of most studies of
conflict and interdependence is that states are less likely to fight if there exist additional opportu-
nity costs associated with military force.”); Edward D. Mansfield & Jon C. Pevehouse, Trade
Blocs, Trade Flows, and International Conflict, 54 INT’L ORG. 775, 776 (2000); McMillan, supra
note 26, at 34–35, 37; Oneal & Russett, The Classical Liberals, supra note 26, at 270; Polachek,
supra note 26, at 56, 60. Patrick McDonald styles this “the opportunity cost or deterrence model.”
McDonald, supra note 23, at 549.
Critics of the “peace through trade” thesis have questioned the existence of such costs, based
upon their finding that “[t]here is no consistent, systematic, and substantial reduction in trade
between belligerents during wartime, and trade between adversaries appears to recover quickly
after the termination of war.” These critics also acknowledge, however, that their evidence is
“modest in strength.” Katherine Barbieri & Jack S. Levy, Sleeping with the Enemy: The Impact of
War on Trade, 36 J. PEACE RES. 463, 475 (1999).
28. See RICHARD ROSECRANCE, THE RISE OF THE TRADING STATE: COMMERCE AND CON-
QUEST IN THE MODERN WORLD 155–62 (1986). McDonald labels this the “efficiency” argument.
McDonald, supra note 23, at 549.
For criticism of the claim that conquest (never) pays in contemporary conditions, see PETER
LIBERMAN, DOES CONQUEST PAY? THE EXPLOITATION OF OCCUPIED INDUSTRIAL SOCIETIES
(1996). Liberman finds that conquest will still pay if the conqueror is ruthless enough. For an
evaluation of the competing claims, see Jervis, supra note 21, at 6.
29. See James D. Fearon, Rationalist Explanations for War, 49 INT’L ORG. 379, 380–81
(1995); R. Harrison Wagner, Bargaining and War, 44 AM. J. POL. SCI. 469, 478–80 (2000).
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tion’s unobservable resolve to go to war over a dispute and thus may
contribute to the dispute’s peaceful resolution.30
Liberal theorists have also made second-level arguments, contending
that foreign trade promotes peace by tilting domestic power towards con-
stituencies that have developed powerful stakes in maintaining peace and
away from constituencies that favor protectionism and that are more prone
to support war-making by the state.31 Another second-level argument
claims that as a state’s ability to harness private sector resources (as through
protectionism) gives it increased fiscal independence from its citizenry and
frees it to construct a war machine.32
Contemporary liberal theories of “peace through trade” have signifi-
cant intellectual competition. Criticism of the theory comes from two
quarters: first, from those who deny that trade has any significant impact
one way or the other on the likelihood of war (or other forms of militarized
interstate conflict) and, second, from those who argue that trade actually
raises the chances of international conflict.33 Interestingly (as we shall see),
some of the critics stand squarely within the liberal tradition itself but be-
lieve that the liberal peace thesis should emphasize economic factors other
than, or in addition to, trade.
Much of the recent criticism builds on the critical insights of the econ-
omist A.O. Hirschman in his National Power and the Structure of Foreign
Trade (1945).34 Hirschman noted that trade between two states may be
asymmetrical. In other words, one trading partner (usually, the one with the
smaller economy) may be far more dependent on maintaining the trading
30. See Gartzke, Li & Boehmer, supra note 26, at 392–93, 399–404 (affirming linkage be-
tween economic interdependence and peace but emphasizing the possibility of “costly signaling”
through capital markets rather than through trade flows); James D. Morrow, How Could Trade
Affect Conflict?, 36 J. PEACE RES. 481, 488 (1999) (finding that while trade has only a modest
tendency to deter conflict—because trade factor that tends to inhibit aggression by one party also
encourages it in the other—states can use trade flows as costly signals to indicate intensity of their
resolve to fight over a disputed issue).
31. See McDonald, supra note 23, at 551–54; Levy, supra note 21, at 356.
32. See Patrick J. McDonald, The Purse Strings of Peace, 51 AM. J. POL. SCI. 569, 571
(2007); McDonald, supra note 23, at 555–56.
33. See Katherine Barbieri, Economic Interdependence: A Path to Peace or a Source of In-
terstate Conflict?, 33 J. PEACE RES. 29, 30–33 (1996) (summarizing competing theories of rela-
tionship between trade and conflict). “Realist” theories of international relations tend to favor the
first of these criticisms although some realists, like Kenneth Waltz, make the second claim; Marx-
ist theories of international relations advance the second criticism.
34. Hirschman argued that although “the case for free trade, on economic or welfare grounds
[is] unanswerable,” nonetheless free trade “does not have the additional merit of doing away with
the political aspect of international economic relations.” ALBERT O. HIRSCHMAN, NATIONAL
POWER AND THE STRUCTURE OF FOREIGN TRADE 76 (1945). For a review and critique of Hirsch-
man’s book, which it judges to be “the most highly developed theory of economic dependence and
its political uses that we have,” see R. Harrison Wagner, Economic Interdependence, Bargaining
Power, and Political Influence, 42 INT’L ORG. 461, 462–65 (1988).
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relationship than the other partner (the larger economy).35 Hirschman
thought that Nazi Germany sought to use foreign trade to make the smaller
economies of Central Europe increasingly dependent on access to the Ger-
man market and hence more submissive to the Nazis’ foreign policy
goals.36 In light of Hirschman’s analysis, some critics of the “peace through
trade” thesis contend that while symmetrical trade ties may promote peace,
“asymmetrical dependence creates tensions that may manifest themselves in
conflict.”37 On that approach, liberal theorists may be right about symmetri-
cal trade but are mistaken about asymmetrical trade.38
One prominent critic of the “peace through trade” thesis is Katherine
Barbieri. Barbieri focuses on the notion of trade “interdependence” which,
though pivotal to the liberal thesis, has proven contentious both to define
and to measure.39 Barbieri broke “interdependence” down into two compo-
35. More fully, because the gains of trade may not accrue proportionately to the trading
states (Germany’s trade with Hungary likely benefited Hungary far more than it did Germany), the
distribution of the gains may affect power relationships between those states (Germany’s threat to
cut off trade with Hungary would be more powerful than Hungary’s threat to cut off trade with
Germany). See Mansfield & Pevehouse, supra note 27, at 776–77.
36. See HIRSCHMAN, supra note 34, at 34–40. To be sure, the small Central European states
(unlike colonies) presumably had alternative markets for their exports and alternative sources of
supply for their imports, even if the terms of trade with them were less beneficial. But in Hirsch-
man’s theory, Germany could attempt to induce or sustain trade dependency by taking special
measures that made it difficult for those states to shift their trade to other partners (e.g., demand-
ing “bilateral agreements” conditioning those states’ ability to export to Germany on their taking
imports from Germany), thus aggravating the difficulties that they would experience in attempting
to shift either their exports or their imports away from Germany; paying above world prices for
their exports; preventing the transit of their exports to third countries; blocking payments; etc.
Further, in order to prevent the development of industry (and the self-dependence in manufactures
that would accompany it) within a smaller trading partner, Germany could engage in practices
such as predatory dumping. Once trade dependency was consolidated, Germany could then exploit
its market power to create both political and economic benefits for itself. On the economic side, it
could impose higher tariffs on products in accordance with the level of dependency on the German
market, in effect price-discriminating in the sale of access to the German market in the same way
that monopolists price discriminate to reap the full advantage of their monopoly power. On the
political side, the payoff would come in the form of increased ability to dominate the smaller
state’s military strategy and foreign policy. The Nazi policy also had the effect of lessening Ger-
many’s dependence on overseas markets, from which the effective British blockade of the First
World War had cut her off, and from which she would likely be cut off again when, as Hitler
planned, war was resumed.
37. Katherine Barbieri & Gerald Schneider, Globalization and Peace: Assessing New Direc-
tions in the Study of Trade and Conflict, 36 J. PEACE RES. 387, 390 (1999); see also Oneal &
Russett, The Classical Liberals, supra note 26, at 271; Ha˚vard Hegre, Size Asymmetry, Trade, and
Militarized Conflict, 48 J. CONFLICT RESOL. 403, 403–04 (2004). In a similar vein, Buzan argues
that a liberal global economic order tends to favor the “center” over the “peripheries,” resulting in
conflict and interventionism by the former in the latter. See Buzan, supra note 25, at 616–17.
38. See Barbieri, supra note 33, at 31–32.
39. See, e.g., Hyung Min Kim & David L. Rousseau, The Classical Liberals Were Half Right
(or Half Wrong): New Tests of the ‘Liberal Peace’, 1960–88, 42 J. PEACE RES. 523, 530 (2005)
(specifying and evaluating various ways in which the literature has operationalized economic in-
terdependence); Eric Gartzke & Quan Li, Measure for Measure: Concept Operationalization and
the Trade Interdependence: Conflict Debate, 40 J. PEACE RES. 553, 554 (2003) (discussing com-
plexities of determining interdependence and suggesting that the debate in the literature “may be
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nents: (1) the “salience” or “importance” of trade to each member of a pair
of trading partners and (2) the “symmetry” of their trade or the “equality of
dependence” between those partners.40 She argued that “interdependence”
resulted from the interaction between “salience” and “symmetry.” She also
used “trade share,” or the share of trade each state maintained with each of
its trading partners, to measure the relative importance to a state of any
single trade relationship with any other and to calculate salience, symmetry,
and interdependence.41 On those assumptions, she found, first, that “rather
than inhibiting conflict, salient trading relationships are more conflict-prone
than other types of relationships, contradicting the liberal argument[;]”42
second, that symmetry or “the balance of dependence” is “more important
for fostering peace than the extent of trade ties[;]”43 and third, that “[n]ot
only does interdependence lack the strength to limit the probability of con-
flict, but . . . [it] actually increases the likelihood of conflict.”44 Thus,
“[a]lthough the salience and symmetry of the relationship initially inhibit
conflict, as either dimension increases, the interaction effect reveals that the
potential for conflict also increases.”45
Barbieri’s findings have been controversial: some critics contend that
they seem to be driven by her chosen measure of interdependence,46 others
that she failed to isolate the relevant trading pairs.47 My point here is not to
affirm the correctness of her views, however. I mention them chiefly to
show that although the “peace through trade” thesis unquestionably has
substantial theoretical and empirical support, it cannot be said, in the cur-
due in part to differences in variable construction”); Gartzke, Li & Boehmer, supra note 26, at 394
(“There are many ways to conceive of interdependence.”).
40. See Barbieri, supra note 33, at 36. Barbieri also used “militarized interstate disputes”
rather than “war” as a measure of “conflict.” Id. at 35. Militarized interstate disputes are “a set of
interactions between or among states involving threats to use military force, displays of military
force, or actual uses of military force.” Charles S. Gochman & Zeev Maoz, Militarized Interstate
Disputes, 1816–1976: Procedures, Patterns, and Insights, 28 J. CONFLICT RESOL. 585, 587
(1984).
41. Barbieri, supra note 33, at 35.
42. Id. at 39.
43. Id. at 40.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. See Gartzke, Li & Boehmer, supra note 26, at 395.
47. See Oneal & Russett, The Classical Liberals, supra note 26, at 272 (stating that Barbieri
analyzed all pairs of states for which trade data were available, thus failing to control for the
spatial distances between trading partners, and arguing that because neighboring states have a high
incidence rate of disputes and also high trade levels in relation to each other, Barbieri’s data set
was “apt to produce a spurious association between interdependence and conflict”).
For a later assessment of the controversy between Barbieri and Oneal and Russett, see Goen-
ner, supra note 26, at 600 (finding that “trade does not have an effect on conflict . . . . [T]he results
do not support the proposition that trade interdependence reduces conflict.”).
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rent state of the debate, to have been incontrovertibly established. Rather,
the debate remains a lively and unsettled one.48
Indeed, some of the leading figures in the debate—especially those in
the “liberal peace” tradition of thought—are now suggesting that while
markets undoubtedly have an effect on the likelihood of international con-
flict, the focus should no longer be entirely, or even mainly, on trade. Thus,
in his important 2007 article The Capitalist Peace, Eric Gartzke writes:
Of the factors emphasized by liberal political economists, trade
has been by far the most closely evaluated in contemporary schol-
arship. . . . Yet, of the elements of global capitalism, trade is ar-
guably the least important in terms of mitigating warfare.
Classical political economists had yet to consider the strategic na-
ture of conflict. . . . If trade makes one partner more pliant, it
should allow other states to become more aggressive . . ., so that
the overall decline in warfare is small or nonexistent. . . . Eco-
nomic development, financial markets, and monetary policy coor-
dination all arguably play a more critical role in promoting
peace. . . . Much of the impact of free markets on peace will be
missed if much of what comprises capitalism is omitted or
ignored.49
And even analysts who believe that trade has a special explanatory
value in studying the causes of international armed conflict have suggested
that future research be directed to the role of preferential trading arrange-
ments (PTAs), such as free trade areas, common markets, and customs un-
ions, rather than to trade as such. Thus, Mansfield’s and Pevehouse’s
research found that:
For states that do not belong to the same PTA, the flow of trade
has only a weak impact on hostilities. For PTA members, how-
ever, rising commerce strongly reduces the likelihood of military
conflict. Furthermore, parties to the same PTA are less prone to
engage in military disputes than other states, an influence that
grows increasingly large as the flow of trade expands.50
As Mansfield and Pevehouse note, their findings contradict not only
the view that “international trade has little systematic impact on hostilities”
but also “the unqualified claim that increased trade reduces the prospect of
military disputes.”51 Instead, the effect of unfettered trade on peace “hinges
48. See, e.g., Kim & Rousseau, supra note 39, at 523–24 (summarizing state of debate). Note
that these two researchers find that “the evidence strongly suggests that there is no pacifying effect
of economic interdependence. . . . The results also indicate that the unconditional liberals who
argue that international interdependence promotes peace are incorrect.” Id. at 538.
49. Eric Gartzke, The Capitalist Peace, 51 AM. J. POL. SCI. 166, 170 (2007) (citations and
footnotes omitted).
50. Mansfield & Pevehouse, supra note 27, at 803.
51. Id.
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largely on the institutional setting (or lack thereof) in which trade is
conducted.”52
The soundness or unsoundness of the “peace through trade” thesis
does not, of course, decide the question whether Professor Bhala’s
“counter-terrorism through trade” thesis is correct or incorrect. Nonetheless,
it may help us to assess Bhala’s thesis more intelligently. First, our review
certainly reveals that there is substantial evidence linking some forms of
international trade with the reduction of conflict between nations. That
should encourage us to expect that there may also be evidence that some
forms of trade may also have quieting effects on transnational terrorism. On
the other hand, despite its long and pedigreed past, the “peace through
trade” thesis remains unproven, contested, and, in the view of some leading
experts, over-simple. Moreover, one can credit economic or financial fac-
tors with a significant role in diminishing international conflict without at-
tributing such an effect to trade. Those conclusions invite us to scrutinize
Bhala’s thesis with a more skeptical eye.
II. THE “COUNTER-TERRORISM THROUGH TRADE” THESIS
Bhala’s theory about the linkage between trade and counter-terrorism,
I suggest, is a variant of the traditional “peace through trade” thesis. Bhala
is not alone in arguing that trade will prevent terrorism. Take, for example,
the historian and financial analyst William Bernstein’s A Splendid Ex-
change: How Trade Shaped the World (2008). After briefly discussing the
arguments for the traditional “peace through trade” theory, Bernstein says:
Today’s greatest threats to world security come not from conven-
tional armies, but rather from terrorism based in the world’s failed
states—precisely those parts of the globe that would benefit most
from freer trade and a decrease in agricultural subsidies. To para-
phrase Bastiat, if cotton, sugar, and rice can cross borders, then
perhaps terrorists will not be able to.53
But Bhala’s (and Bernstein’s) view differs from the more traditional
theory in three, or perhaps four, main ways. First, Bhala’s theory appears to
concern relationships between states and non-state actors, such as al Qaeda
or Hamas, and not between states and other states. Second, Bhala believes
that trade will tend to suppress terrorism rather than interstate war or milita-
rized conflict. Third, Bhala’s thesis is limited to violent Islamist move-
ments, rather than applying generally. And fourth, Bhala might be read as
saying that a particular “preferential trading arrangement”—the Doha
Round—will have pacifying effects, not that the growth of trade generally,
even without such an institutional structure, would have. Despite these dif-
52. Id.
53. WILLIAM J. BERNSTEIN, A SPLENDID EXCHANGE: HOW TRADE SHAPED THE WORLD 376
(2008).
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ferences, the kinship or affinity between Bhala’s thesis and the traditional
liberal theory of trade is obvious and substantial.
But what exactly is Bhala’s thesis? Is it a solution in search of a prob-
lem? And if the problem that it seeks to solve remains a real one, is the
solution valid? Of these questions, the most important and absorbing is the
last because it raises the issue: Does poverty cause terrorism? In what fol-
lows, I will take up these questions in turn.
A. What Exactly is Bhala Claiming?
As she lay dying, Gertrude Stein is reported to have said, “What is the
answer?” Then, as she expired, she said, “What is the question?” Before we
can attempt to evaluate Bhala’s thesis, we need to understand it better.
As stated, Bhala’s thesis would seem to encompass all forms of Is-
lamist violence. But at least four different kinds of radical Islamism need to
be distinguished. First, there is state-sponsored radical Islamist violence, of
the sort that Khomeini’s Iran engaged in during the years immediately after
the 1979 Iranian Revolution (and probably later) or that Ghaddafi’s Libya
practiced in incidents such as the 1988 attack on Pan Am Flight 103 over
Lockerbie. Second, there is the kind of violence practiced by Islamist revo-
lutionary movements such as Hamas in Palestine, Hezbollah in Lebanon, or
Lashkar-e-Taiba in Pakistan and India. These groups either are, or resem-
ble, national liberation movements. Their violence seems to have discerni-
ble political goals in view, such as the liberation of Kashmir or Palestine,
and to be restricted to their own locale or region. Third, there is transna-
tional terrorism, such as practiced by al Qaeda, which is targeted on “the far
enemy” and is global in reach.54 Finally, there is domestic or home-grown
Islamist radicalism, such as might be found inside the United States, Great
Britain, Spain, India, or elsewhere.55 Of course the connections between
these different types of violent actors may be close, as is the case with Iran
and Hezbollah. But it is nonetheless analytically useful to distinguish them.
Is Professor Bhala claiming that all four forms of violent Islamist radi-
calism would be abated by the Doha Round, or that only some of them
would be? I am uncertain, but I think that he probably would say that
Doha’s impact would be felt mainly by non-state, non-domestic move-
ments—that is, by transnational terrorist networks like al Qaeda, and per-
haps also by radical Islamist movements like Hamas and Hezbollah in the
Middle East. (I can only conjecture whether he would extend the claim to
local Islamist movements in—for example, the Philippines or Indonesia—
although I suspect that he would.)56
54. See FAWAZ A. GERGES, THE FAR ENEMY: WHY JIHAD WENT GLOBAL 119–51 (2009).
55. On Islamism in the West, see OLIVIER ROY, GLOBALIZED ISLAM: THE SEARCH FOR A NEW
UMMAH (2004).
56. On Islamist terrorism in South Asia, see AYESHA JALAL, PARTISANS OF ALLAH: JIHAD IN
SOUTH ASIA 239–301 (2008).
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Furthermore, what exactly does Bhala mean by “trade”? Is his thesis
that the aggregate volume of foreign trade will have counter-terrorist ef-
fects? Or that as foreign trade grows as a proportion of a state’s gross
domestic product, terrorism will decline there? Or is the critical variable a
certain form of trade—for example, trade conducted under preferential trad-
ing arrangement? Or something else? Saudi Arabia, with its large oil ex-
ports, is a significant player in world trade, at least by some measures: with
a small population of just over 25,000,000, it carries on about $16,000,000
in trade per capita each year, ranks twelfth in the world in export of mer-
chandise (excluding intra-European Union trade), and contributes about
1.5% of the world’s total exports.57 Moreover, the Saudis’ merchandise
trade, as a percentage of the country’s gross domestic product, has been
trending sharply upwards since the late 1990s.58 What, if anything, should
these facts lead us to expect about Islamist terrorism in Saudi Arabia or by
those who live there?
Finally, is Bhala’s theory a micro-level one, concerned with individual
motivations, or a macro-level one, dealing with relationships between dif-
ferent states? Depending on which question we ask, we are likely to dis-
cover different results.59
B. Is the Thesis a Solution in Search of a Problem?
Only someone who was very imprudent would claim that the problem
of violent Islamist radicalism has disappeared. Indeed, it may be that the
“Arab Spring” will sweep into power an entire generation of Islamists in
Egypt, Tunisia, Libya, Yemen, Syria, and elsewhere in the Arab world who
are hostile to the West and support terrorism against it. One can hardly rule
out a takeover of Pakistan by similar forces.60 And only last August, one
leading expert on terrorism warned that al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula
(AQAP) is trying to produce the lethal poison ricin and pack it in small
bombs for attacks on the U.S. homeland.61 But from our current perspective
(autumn 2011), there is reason to believe that the most intense period of
Islamist violence is in the past62 and that the forms of Islamism that are
likely to be successful in democratic competition will be inimical to terror-
ism and pragmatic in their attitudes towards the West.
57. Trade Profiles: Saudi Arabia, Kingdom of, WORLD TRADE ORG. (Oct. 2011), http://stat.
wto.org/CountryProfile/WSDBCountryPFView.aspx?Language=E&Country=SA.
58. Id.
59. The distinction between the two inquiries is emphasized in, for example, Jon Elster,
Motivations and Beliefs in Suicide Missions, in MAKING SENSE OF SUICIDE MISSIONS 233, 244–45
(Diego Gambetta ed., 2006).
60. See JOHN R. SCHMIDT, THE UNRAVELING: PAKISTAN IN THE AGE OF JIHAD (2011).
61. See Bruce Riedel, AQAP’s ‘Great Expectations’ for the Future, COMBATING TERRORISM
CENTER, (Aug. 1, 2011), http://www.ctc.usma.edu/posts/aqap/.
62. See, e.g., Richard Dearlove, Violent Islamism Has Failed, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 4, 2011,
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/11/05/opinion/violent-islamism-has-failed.html?pagewanted=all.
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Consider what Professor Vali Nasr says in his important book on the
rise of the new Muslim middle class, Forces of Fortune (2009):
The great irony of the fundamentalist threat is that the two
years from 1979 to 1981 in which Islamic fundamentalism shook
the world and terrified the West were also its high point of power.
That is not to say, of course, that after fundamentalism won Iran,
turned Pakistan, and destabilized Egypt it just died out; funda-
mentalists are too vocal, active, well-organized, and well-funded
for that. Fundamentalism most definitely remains a worry, and its
extremist edge a serious threat. Extremism that has been festering
in the innards of Pakistan’s society is surging, laying claim to vast
swaths of its territory, and those extremist forces are waging a
two-pronged war against not only foreign troops but the govern-
ments of both Afghanistan and Pakistan. The thought of nuclear-
armed Pakistan, with its 175-million-plus population—deeply di-
vided along ethnic lines, and with a troubled economy and weak
government—unraveling before the extremist onslaught is un-
nerving to say the least. A failed Pakistan in the clutches of ex-
tremism or plunged into civil war, and with no safeguards locking
down its nuclear arsenal, would be deeply destabilizing for the
region and the world.
The larger truth about fundamentalism’s drive to power,
though, is that since 1980 it has toppled no more dominoes. . . .
The West must remain vigilant against fundamentalism, but that
should not stop Western policymakers and publics from seeing
the “whole picture” in the Middle East, and a vital truth of the
region is that the fundamentalist strain of Islam is not practiced by
the vast majority of the population, and is not on the rise.63
Nasr wrote before the Arab Spring, but his essential conclusions seem
to remain true.64 Thus far at least, there are few signs that the majority of
the Egyptian, Tunisian, Libyan, or other Arab populations are turning to
radical fundamentalism or finding hope in redemptive violence. If anything,
the Arab revolutions seem aimed against corrupt governments that engorge
63. VALI NASR, FORCES OF FORTUNE: THE RISE OF THE NEW MUSLIM MIDDLE CLASS AND
WHAT IT WILL MEAN FOR OUR WORLD 10 (2009).
64. Analyses published since Nasr wrote underscore the rise of entrepreneurialism and other
capitalist virtues in the Middle East. See, e.g., THE SILATECH INDEX: VOICES OF YOUNG ARABS 16
(2010), available at http://sas-origin.onstreammedia.com/origin/gallupinc/media/poll/pdf/Silatech.
Report.2010.Nov.pdf (“The Arab world is unique in having a relatively high proportion of young
people expressing the desire to start a business. While only 4% of young people in North America
or Europe say they plan to launch a business in the next year, 15% of young Arabs have this
ambition. . . . Entrepreneurial inclinations . . . are especially prevalent in middle-income countries
where 57% of young people say they plan to start a business in the next year.”); id. at 44 (“Across
the region, 67% of young Arabs aged 15 to 29 hold a favorable opinion of entrepreneurs. Among
aspiring entrepreneurs, 70% say the same.”).
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their nations’ wealth,65 deny basic liberties or rig elections,66 and have done
nothing to raise their peoples from poverty.67 Observers detect little popular
enthusiasm for al Qaeda or what it represents; if anything, the Arab Spring
can be seen as an alternative to al Qaeda’s program of apocalyptic jihadist
violence, mass terror, and a revived caliphate.68 Although “bin Laden’s
long-sought revolutions in the Arab world are finally happening, [giving] al
Qaeda a rare opportunity to start building Islamic states,” the revolutions
have belied al Qaeda’s expectations “by empowering not jihadists but Is-
lamist parliamentarians.”69 Many of these oppose one-party government
and favor honest elections. The former Egyptian jihadist Mohammed Abdel
Rahman, son of the so-called “blind sheik” Omar Rahman, the organizer of
the 1993 bombing of the World Trade Center and a founder of al Qaeda, is
a case in point. Speaking recently in Cairo’s Tahrir Square, Rahman said:
“My vision hasn’t changed, but the political agenda has. Egypt now has
become a free and democratic country, so I would advise young people to
engage in political activities rather than taking up arms—everything has
changed.”70
That there will be a pronounced “Islamist” turn to the Arab revolutions
is likely, though not certain. The first elections of the Arab Spring, held last
October in Tunisia, gave a plurality of the votes to Ennahda, usually charac-
terized as a “moderate” and “progressive” Islamist party, which quickly en-
tered into negotiations with more “liberal” parties to form a government.71
Polling in Egypt—by far the most important of the post-revolutionary Arab
states—showed a majority (51.6% versus 41.4%) favoring a civil demo-
65. See Julie Ray & Richard Burkholder, Yemenis See Widespread Corruption in Govern-
ment: About One in Three Say Government Doing Enough to Fight Graft, GALLUP, June 9, 2011,
http://www.gallup.com/poll/147980/yemenis-widespread-corruption-government.aspx.
66. See Mohamed Younis, Before Uprising, Egyptians Lacked Faith in Honesty of Elections,
GALLUP, Feb. 24, 2011, http://www.gallup.com/poll/146309/uprising-egyptians-lacked-faith-hon-
esty-elections.aspx; Bryant Ott & Mohamed Younis, Egyptians Optimistic Post-Revolution: Post-
Revolution Survey Reveals Areas in Need of Attention, GALLUP, June 6, 2011, http://www.gallup.
com/poll/147938/egyptians-optimistic-post-revolution.aspx.
67. See Julie Ray, Before Conflict, Many Young Libyans Doubted Role in Progress: Libya’s
Youth Less Sure Than Young People in Other Middle-Income Arab Countries, GALLUP, Mar. 21,
2011, http://www.gallup.com/poll/146726/conflict-young-libyans-doubted-role-progress.aspx.
68. This is not to deny the powerful hold of the idea of the caliphate on many Muslims. See
FAISAL DEVJI, THE TERRORIST IN SEARCH OF HUMANITY: MILITANT ISLAM AND GLOBAL POLITICS
97–104 (2008).
69. William McCants, Al Qaeda’s Challenge: The Jihadists’ War with Islamist Democrats,
90 FOREIGN AFF., Sept./Oct. 2011, at 20, 21.
70. Doug Saunders, Al-Qaeda’s Zealots of Yesteryear Turning to Politics, Democracy,
GLOBE & MAIL, Sept. 9, 2011, http://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/opinions/opinion/al-
qaedas-zealots-of-yesteryear-turning-to-politics-democracy/article2159810/ (quoting Omar
Rahman).
71. See David D. Kirkpatrick, Moderate Islamist Party Heads Toward Victory in Tunisia,
N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 24, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/10/25/world/africa/ennahda-moderate-
islamic-party-makes-strong-showing-in-tunisia-vote.html?pagewanted=all.
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cratic state over an Islamic state.72 Moreover, given the continuing influ-
ence and prestige of the Army in Egyptian affairs, even if Islamist parties
win electoral victories, Egypt may ultimately become “a new Pharaonic
state in an Islamic garb.”73
Furthermore, proponents of an Islamic state come in different varieties,
from the more pragmatic to the more radical. Even assuming that Islamism
of one kind or the other will dominate future political debates in Egypt and
Tunisia, an intra-Islamist debate (between, say, Egyptian Salafists and the
Muslim Brotherhood) may sideline violent jihadists no less than secularists
and liberals. For many Islamists (including some in the Muslim Brother-
hood), Turkey, not Iran, is the model to be adopted. Not President
Ahmadinejad’s Iran (let alone bin Laden’s al Qaeda), but Turkish Prime
Minister Erdogan’s Justice and Development Party may therefore be the
paradigm for the Islamist governments of the post-revolutionary Arab
world.74 Islamism may find a middle way between secularism (or, in more
local terms, “Kemalism”75) and violent, radical fundamentalism. The Arab
Spring does not, thus far, seem likely to reverse the transformation that Vali
Nasr sees occurring in the Arab and Muslim worlds through the “energetic
blending of Islamic piety and capitalist fervor.”76 As some analysts have
argued, Islamist parties may (for pragmatic reasons) place the emphasis less
on Islamizing the legal system than on “good governance and the fight
72. See Abdel Monem Said Aly, The Paradox of the Egyptian Revolution, 55 MIDDLE E.
BRIEF 1, 6 (2006), available at http://www.brandeis.edu/crown/publications/meb/MEB55.pdf. Al-
together 7.4% favor a strong Egyptian state even if it is not democratic.
73. Id.
74. See Anthony Shadid & David D. Kirkpatrick, Activists in Arab World Vie to Define
Islamic State, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 29, 2001, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/09/30/world/middleeast/
arab-debate-pits-islamists-against-themselves.html?pagewanted=all; see also Aly, supra note 72,
at 6 (“More likely than not, Egypt’s future lies somewhere between the Turkish and Iranian mod-
els.”). For more pessimistic views of an Islamist ascendancy, see Benny Morris, Arab Spring or
Islamist Surge?, NAT’L INT., Nov. 3, 2011, http://nationalinterest.org/commentary/arab-spring-or-
islamist-surge-6108; Richard N. Haass, The Arab Spring Has Given Way to a Long, Hot Summer,
FIN. TIMES, July 6, 2011, http://www.cfr.org/middle-east/arab-spring-has-given-way-long-hot-
summer/p25426# (seeing “a series of developments that are beginning to produce a region that is
less tolerant, less prosperous, and less stable tha[n] what existed”); Ray Takeyh, U.S. Must Take
Sides to Keep the Arab Spring from Islamist Takeover, WASH. POST, Mar. 23, 2011, http://www.
washingtonpost.com/opinions/us-must-take-sides-to-keep-the-arab-spring-from-islamist-takeover/
2011/03/23/ABNhI2KB_story.html (“The ideology of Islamist associations is predicated on the
notion that religion is a comprehensive belief system that is both eternal and transnational. The
moderation that these groups have exhibited in the past few decades in places such as Egypt was
pragmatism born out of compulsion, not some kind of intellectual evolution. Relieved of the con-
straints of Arab police states, they are free to advance their illiberal, anti-Western agendas.”).
75. On “Kemalism”—Turkey’s post-Ottoman secular nationalist ideology—see NIYAZI
BERKES, THE DEVELOPMENT OF SECULARISM IN TURKEY 461–503 (1999).
76. NASR, supra note 63, at 11.
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against corruption, a free-market economy and a pluralistic political
system.”77
The United States and the West might indeed benefit from having Is-
lamist parties compete for votes. If successful, Islamists “might present
themselves as the West’s most effective allies against its most dangerous
foes: armed jihadists, whom they have the religious legitimacy to contain
and, if necessary, cripple; and Iran, whose appeal to the Arab street they can
counteract by . . . presenting a less aggressive, more attractive, and indige-
nous Islamic model.”78 Alternatively, participation in an open, competitive
electoral process might reveal that some Islamist groups simply lacked an
attractive political program.79
Al Qaeda’s new leader, the Egyptian Ayman al-Zawahiri, himself ex-
pressed forebodings about the future course of the Egyptian revolution in a
recent six-part message to the Egyptian people.80 The fourth of Zawahiri’s
messages in particular (dated March 3, 2011) sounded the alarm that the
United States would work with well-disposed local forces in Egypt to win
elections and install a government with which the West could deal.81 But
even an Egyptian movement sympathetic to Zawahiri’s radical viewpoint,
the Islamist organization al-Gama al-Islamiyya (the “Islamic Group”) has
foresworn violence and established a political party to compete in forth-
77. Hussein Agha & Robert Malley, The Arab Counterrevolution, N.Y. REV. BOOKS, Sept.
30, 2011, http://www.nybooks.com/articles/archives/2011/sep/29/arab-counterrevolution/?pagina-
tion=false.
78. Id.
79. See Katerina Dalacoura, The Brotherhood Will Soon Be Left Behind, FIN. TIMES, Mar. 21,
2011, http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/481e3c6c-53f2-11e0-8bd7-00144feab49a.html#axzz1jxHvMT
Qx.
80. See, e.g., Ayman al-Zawahiri, Message of Hope and Glad Tidings to Our People in
Egypt, Episode 4, Statement released by al-Qaeda’s As-Sahab Media Foundation (Mar. 3, 2011),
available at http://www.flashpoint-intel.com/images/documents/pdf/1210/flashpoint_zawahiri02
11.pdf.
81. Zawahiri said:
[T]here are who want to reach the rule in Egypt through a deal with America in order to
guarantee for her continuity in her interests and crimes, in return for a fake political life
and false freedoms that revolve around the American orbit, and that would bring us back
to the fake political life during the monarchic era. There are those who want to resolve
Egypt’s problems by submitting to America and seeking her help, and those are turning
a blind eye intentionally from the point that America is the root of the problem.
The free and honorable ones in Egypt must realize the nature of the struggle and that the
local enemies are but agents for the external enemies, and that political freedom cannot
be achieved away from freeing humans from polytheism and dependency on the foreign
invaders, and it cannot be achieved except by removing the occupying forces from
Egypt and the Arabian Peninsula, and Afghanistan, Iraq, Palestine and the rest of the
Muslim homelands. And it cannot be achieved except by fair distribution of wealth so
food is not stolen from the mouth of the poor to be added to the accounts of the thieves
outside Egypt.
They must realize that so the fruits of their outrage are not stolen and the gains of their
uprising taken.
Id.
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coming elections.82 Al Qaeda seems unable to prevent the emergence of
some form of parliamentary democracy in Egypt.
Finally, does the threat of transnational terrorism posed by al Qaeda
remain a serious one? In his recent, richly documented book The Rise and
Fall of al-Qaeda (2011), Fawaz Gerges of the London School of Econom-
ics argues powerfully that al Qaeda is a spent force. Gerges argues:
So what remains of al-Qaeda? Very little. Today it is composed
of roving bands limited to the mountains and valleys of Pakistan
tribal areas along the Afghan border (where bin Laden was as-
sumed to be hiding), remote areas in Yemen along the Saudi bor-
der, and the wastes of the African Sahara and the Maghreb. Its
actions show a consistent pattern of ineptitude. Its leadership re-
lies, increasingly, on inexperienced freelancers or unskilled re-
cruits. . . . American and Western intelligence agencies now
believe that there are somewhere around 300 surviving members
of al-Qaeda, based mainly in Pakistan and Afghanistan, into
which the United States has poured nearly 100,000 troops. Most
of al-Qaeda’s skilled operatives and mid-level field lieutenants
have been either killed or captured, depleting the ranks of sea-
soned fighters and effective managers, and depriving it of signifi-
cant operational capability. Cooks, drivers, bodyguards, and foot
soldiers now make up the bulk of al-Qaeda’s membership. Al-
Qaeda’s centralized command and control has been dismantled
and its top leaders have gone deeper and deeper underground,
choosing personal safety over operational efficacy—even accord-
ing to US intelligence. . . . Moreover, al-Qaeda faces a leadership
crisis that could further diminish its capabilities. . . . In other
words, the bin Laden group—as we might term the remnants—
has lost the struggle for Muslim hearts and minds. In many coun-
tries, information about al-Qaeda suspects now comes from citi-
zens, including family members, friends, and neighbors, not from
surveillance and intelligence sources. This shift demonstrates a
hardening of Muslim public sentiment against bin Laden’s men,
preaching of a transnational jihad centered on violence no longer
resonates with ordinary Muslims, and their organization suffers
from a grave crisis of legitimacy and authority.83
Further, Gerges argues that both religious leaders and the mass publics
of the Muslim world have turned against al Qaeda:
Bin Laden’s transnational jihad and tactics have been de-legiti-
mized from within the world of Islam—discredited and under-
mined by prominent religious scholars and clerics and former
cohorts who jumped ship. Far from gaining traction, Muslims did
not jump on bin Laden’s and Zawahiri’s bandwagon because they
82. See McCants, supra note 69, at 31–32.
83. FAWAZ A. GERGES, THE RISE AND FALL OF AL-QAEDA 5–16 (2011).
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view it as aimless and pointless, devoid of a clear roadmap. For
millions of Arabs and Muslims who revolted against dismal social
conditions and oppression in early 2011, al-Qaeda has nothing
concrete to offer them—no socioeconomic blueprint or political
vision to the complex challenges and threats facing their
societies.84
While other analysts differ with Gerges (an expert of the stature of
Michael Scheuer has forecast a new age of jihad under al-Zawahiri),85 it is
apparent that al Qaeda and its affiliates have suffered huge setbacks since 9/
11, including such spectacular reversals as the killing of Osama bin Laden
last May and, more recently, the killing of U.S. born Anwar al-Awlaki. Bin
Laden’s death has cost al Qaeda dearly: the movement lost a charismatic,
media-savvy leader of world-wide reputation, who had an extensive net-
work of personal and family connections in Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, and
Afghanistan, and who remained until the end al Qaeda’s commander-in-
chief in charge of the operations of al Qaeda and its franchises. Further, the
information that the U.S. acquired from its raid on bin Laden’s compound
may have exposed al Qaeda’s command structure, thus putting al Qaeda’s
leadership at increasing risk.86 While no one can safely proclaim that the
“war on terror” is over, the United States seems to have scored major victo-
ries against its leading antagonist in the conflict against transnational Is-
lamist terrorism. Certainly the terrorist threat to the United States and its
allies seems far less compelling a decade after 9/11 than it did at that time.
In sum, although the danger of Islamist terrorism remains, in current
conditions it is questionable whether that risk is grave enough to warrant, in
itself, the adoption of the Doha Round. Bhala has not offered a solution in
search of a problem; but the problem to which his solution is addressed
seems less fearful than it did a decade ago.
C. Does Poverty Cause Terrorism?
Finally, I come to Bhala’s core claim: that by reducing poverty, the
Doha Round could or would also have reduced terrorism (or some forms of
it).87 Although Bhala considers this claim to be effectively a matter of
“common sense,”88 it is not. Rather, it has been criticized extensively, even
devastatingly, from several different scholarly points of view. It has little to
84. Id. at 198–99; see also id. at 113–16 (analyzing polling data reflecting growing opposi-
tion to jihadism and terrorism in Muslim world).
85. See Michael Scheuer, The Zawahiri Era, NAT’L INT., Sept./Oct. 2011, at 18, 18.
86. See McCants, supra note 69, at 30.
87. Note that trade might abate terrorism in ways other than by reducing poverty. For exam-
ple, growing trade between the Western and Islamic worlds might create greater interdependency
and friendship between the two, inducing Muslim governments that valued the trade to take more
effective counter-terrorist measures. That might perhaps happen even if the effect of trade on
poverty levels in the Muslim world was not large.
88. Bhala, supra note 2, at 21.
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no empirical support, and there is substantial empirical evidence to question
or deny it. Furthermore, even if the social science findings to date have
(often, unavoidable) shortcomings, they are the best objective evidence we
have, and they reflect a widespread consensus across different disciplines.89
The burden of proving an empirical linkage between poverty and terrorism
is on those, like Bhala, who advocate Doha on the basis of its purported
counter-terrorist effects, not on those who question the thesis; and the
champions of the thesis have not met their burden.
To begin with, let me refer again to Vali Nasr’s Forces of Fortune.
Raising the question of the relationship between poverty and violence in the
Muslim world, Nasr writes:
The route from poverty to extremism is surely not inevitable. The
militia gunmen and suicide bombers carrying out extremist at-
tacks are usually poor, but their leaders often come from a higher
class, as was true with Ayatollah Khomeini, who was born into a
family of landowners. Osama bin Laden and Ayman al-Zawahiri
both grew up in affluence. A recent Gallup poll of the Muslim
world found that extremists tend to be better educated, hold better
jobs with higher responsibilities, and garner higher incomes than
self-described moderates. Poverty and extremism are entangled in
complex ways, and we cannot say that poverty alone accounts for
extremism.90
The leadership, and much or most of the rank-and-file, of al Qaeda
simply do not fit the picture of desperate, impoverished, and uneducated
revolutionaries.91 If anything, these terrorists seem far more like the “reac-
tionary modernists” whom the historian Jeffrey Herf famously identified in
leading roles in the Nazi movement: engineers, journalists, pilots, research
scientists, lawyers, doctors, and other middle-class professionals who em-
braced modern technology but who sought to put it to ideologically bizarre
and sinister ends.92 Or, to use a more contemporary analogy, in their heroic,
voluntary sacrifices on behalf (as they see it) of suffering, globalized hu-
manity, they are not unlike the dedicated middle-class doctors who staff
89. To say “Never Mind the Regressions” is really no answer to the problems. Id. at 20. As I
hope to show, the social science findings taken as a whole are simply too consistent and substan-
tial to be brushed away so casually.
90. Nasr, supra note 63, at 172.
91. See, e.g., FARHAD KHOSROKHAVAR, SUICIDE BOMBERS: ALLAH’S NEW MARTYRS 3
(David Macey trans., 2005) (2002) (The “subjectivity” of most al Qaeda members “is not that of
marginalised or wretched individuals who have been excluded or rejected by society. They are
often from the middle classes and have no major problems in integrating.  In most cases, they are
in fact much more integrated than the average citizen. . . . On the contrary, such terrorists are, in a
way, products of our world.”).
92. See JEFFREY HERF, REACTIONARY MODERNISM: TECHNOLOGY, CULTURE, AND POLITICS IN
WEIMAR AND THE THIRD REICH 2–3, 12 (1986).
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humanitarian organizations like Me´decins sans Frontie`res or the trained le-
gal professionals who work for NGOs like Amnesty International.93
A case in point is Anwar al-Awlaki, the U.S.-born imam and cyber-
jihadist who was targeted and killed in September by a CIA drone strike in
Yemen.94 Al-Awlaki’s father Nasir al-Awlaki came to the United States in
order to pursue a degree in agricultural economics, and his son Anwar was
born in New Mexico in 1971. Nasir al-Awlaki later became Minister of
Agriculture in his native Yemen and then President of the Sana’a University
there. Anwar spent his teenage years in Yemen but returned to the United
States in 1991 to obtain a degree in engineering at Colorado State Univer-
sity. He later obtained an M.A. in education in San Diego and registered as
a doctoral student in human resource development at George Washington
University in 2001. In his career as a journalist, inspirational leader, re-
cruiter, and operational planner for AQAP, al-Awlaki used the latest social
media and other communication technologies, including YouTube, Twitter,
and Paltak, to reach large audiences both in the Muslim world and the West.
He contributed to the slick AQAP online periodical Inspire, using that fo-
rum to attack moderate Islamic scholars. Inspire, which was addressed to
young, English-speaking Muslims in the West, was edited and illustrated by
25-year old Samir Kahn, a Saudi-born U.S. citizen and computer program-
ming specialist who grew up in New York City and who was killed in the
same drone strike in which al-Awlaki died.95 (Ibrahim Hassan Tali al-Siri,
93. For the surprising structural resemblances between transnational terrorists and humanitar-
ians, see DEVJI, supra note 68, at 5–9.
94. For accounts of al-Awlaki background and activities, see Rohan Gunaratna, Al-Qaeda
After Awlaki, NAT’L INT., Oct. 18, 2011, http://nationalinterest.org/commentary/al-qaeda-after-
awlaki-6026; Christopher Heffelfinger, Anwar al-Awlaqi: Profile of a Jihadist Radicalizer, COM-
BATING TERRORISM CENTER. (Mar. 3, 2010), http://www.ctc.usma.edu/posts/anwar-al-awlaqi-pro-
file-of-a-jihadi-radicalizer; Billo Roggio, US-Born Cleric Awlaki ‘Proud’ to Have Taught al
Qaeda Operatives, LONG WAR J. (Apr. 27, 2010), http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2010/
04/usborn_cleric_awlaki.php; Bill Roggio, US Adds Anwar al-Awlaki to List of Designated Ter-
rorists, LONG WAR J. (July 16, 2010), http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2010/07/us_
designates_anwar-print.php; Thomas Joscelyn, Analysis: Anwar Awlaki’s Message to Inspire
Readers, LONG WAR J. (Oct. 21, 2010), http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2010/10/analy-
sis_anwar_awlak-print.php; Thomas Jocelyn, Awlaki’s Emails to Terror Plotter Show Operational
Role, LONG WAR J. (Mar. 2, 2011), http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2011/03/anwar_al_
awlakis_ema.php; Thomas Jocelyn, AQAP  Confirms Anwar al-Awlaki Killed in US Drone Strike,
LONG WAR J. (Oct. 10, 2011), http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2011/10/al_qaeda_con-
firms_an.php; Hakim al-Massmari, Margaret Coker & Siobhan Gorman, Drone Kills Top al
Qaeda Figure, WALL ST. J., Oct. 1, 2011, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB100014240529702041
38204576602301252340820.html; Mark Mazzetti, Eric Schmitt & Robert F. Worth, Two-Year
Manhunt Led to Killing of Awlaki in Yemen, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 30, 2011, http://www.nytimes.
com/2011/10/01/world/middleeast/anwar-al-awlaki-is-killed-in-yemen.html?pagewanted=all;
Anwar al-Awlaki killed in Yemen: Official Confirms Death in al-Jawf of dual Yemeni-American
Citizen Accused by US of Spreading al-Qaeda’s Message, AL JAZEERA (Sept. 30, 2011), http://
www.aljazeera.com/news/middleeast/2011/09/201193083340115111.html.
95. For a profile of Khan before he left the United States for Yemen in 2009, see Michael
Moss & Souad Mekhennet, An Internet Jihad Aims at U.S. Viewers, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 15, 2007,
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/10/15/us/15net.html?pagewanted=all.
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the sophisticated Saudi bomb-maker for AQAP who was mistakenly
thought to have been killed in that strike, studied Chemistry at King Saud
University.)96 U.S. Army Major Nidal Hasan, who is accused of having
killed twelve U.S. service members and a civilian at Fort Hood in Novem-
ber 2009, contacted al-Awlaki through the internet. Al-Awlaki allegedly
provided him with a fatwa or legal ruling that permitted him to kill Ameri-
can servicemen.97 Rajib Karim, the Bengladeshi-born computer expert em-
ployed by British Airways who was convicted by a British court last
February on terrorism charges, corresponded with and received guidance
from al-Awlaki using the most sophisticated encryption techniques that the
British authorities had seen.
In short, al-Awlaki combined professional scientific training, mastery
of modern communications and visual technology, and a violent, anti-lib-
eral ideology in ways that were also highly characteristic of the earlier
forms of reactionary modernism. The faces of contemporary jihadism
aimed against the West are not those of the impoverished and uneducated
but of figures like al-Awlaki, Kahn, al-Siri, Hasan, and Karim.98
The prominence of educated, middle-class professionals in the leader-
ship and ranks of jihadist movements should not be surprising. Studies of
the question have repeatedly failed to show a significant empirical link be-
tween poverty and terrorism—the claim that Bhala, not his critics, has the
burden of proving. The Princeton economist Alan B. Krueger has been at
the forefront of those studies for over a decade. In his 2007 book What
Makes a Terrorist: Economics and the Roots of Terrorism, Krueger summa-
rizes the results of the extensive research that he, his colleagues, and others
have done. He writes bluntly:
96. See Siobhan Gorman, U.S. Targets Bomb Maker in Yemen for Terror Ties, WALL ST. J.,
Nov. 1, 2011, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052970204394804577010141334953180.
html.
97. In an interview with Al Jazeera, al-Awlaki denied issuing such a fatwa. See Interview:
Anwar al-Awlaki: Yemen-Based Religious Scholar Says He Supports Attempt to Blow Up a US-
Bound Plane, AL JAZEERA (Feb. 7, 2010), http://english.aljazeera.net/focus/2010/02/2010271074
776870.
98. Lest it be thought that I am being unfairly selective in focusing on one highly visible,
U.S.-born al Qaeda leader and those associated with him, let me refer to a study by the Norwegian
terrorist expert Thomas Hegghammer of the socio-economic backgrounds of Saudi militants who
crossed over into Iraq between 2003–05 to join the insurgency against the United States and other
Allied forces. Based on his analysis of the biographies of 205 Saudi militants killed in Iraq,
Hegghammer found that:
[a]lthough data on their socio-economic background are limited, it points to a very di-
verse group. Some were very poor, while others came from rich and privileged families.
Information about their education level is also sparse, but indicates that many were
highly educated: 14 of the 16 for whom we know the education level attended higher
education, one even had a doctorate. We know the occupation of 26 individuals, which
included 14 students, 3 private sector workers, 2 government clerks, 2 nurses, 2 police/
military officers, a teacher, a car mechanic and a meteorologist.
See THOMAS HEGGHAMMER, SAUDI MILITANTS IN IRAQ: BACKGROUNDS AND RECRUITMENT PAT-
TERNS 12 (2007), available at http://www.ffi.no/no/Rapporter/06-03875.pdf. These figures do not
suggest that the slain Saudis were driven to support the Iraqi insurgency by their poverty.
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Although there is a certain surface appeal to blaming economic
circumstances and lack of education for terrorist acts, the evi-
dence is nearly unanimous in rejecting either material deprivation
or inadequate education as an important cause of support for ter-
rorism or of participation in terrorist activities. The popular expla-
nations for terrorism—poverty, lack of education, or the catchall
“they hate our way of life and freedom”—simply have no system-
atic empirical basis. These explanations have been embraced al-
most entirely on faith, not scientific evidence.
While people who are unemployed or employed in low-paying
jobs have a low cost of engaging in political and protest activities
and may be angry because of their circumstances, the fact is that
they typically do not lash out at the world. Half the world’s popu-
lation lives on $2.00 a day or less [citation omitted]. More than
one billion people worldwide have a primary school education or
less and some 785 million adults are illiterate [citations omitted].
If poverty and inadequate education were causes of terrorism,
even minor ones, the world would be teeming with terrorists ea-
ger to destroy our way of life. . . .
Instead of being drawn from the ranks of the poor, numerous aca-
demic and government studies find that terrorists tend to be
drawn from well-educated, middle-class or high-income families.
Among those who have seriously and impartially studied the
question, there is not much question that poverty has little to do
with terrorism.99
For example, Krueger cites a 2004 study by Marc Sageman, a forensic
psychiatrist and former CIA case officer. Using unclassified data, Sageman
examined the education and occupational backgrounds of al Qaeda mem-
bers. He found that about thirty five percent of them were college educated
and about forty five percent were drawn from skilled professions.100 Like-
wise, research on Arab suicide bombers by University of Chicago Professor
Robert Pape found that they emphatically did not fit the profile of social
losers. On the contrary, both religious and secular Arab suicide bombers
were much better educated and had higher incomes than members of their
peer groups, were seldom unemployed or poor, and were typically drawn
from the working or middle classes.101
99. ALAN B. KRUEGER, WHAT MAKES A TERRORIST: ECONOMICS AND THE ROOTS OF TER-
RORISM 2–3 (2007).
100. Id. at 43–44 (citing MARC SAGEMAN, UNDERSTANDING TERROR NETWORKS (2004)). Of
course, education is at best a proxy for wealth or income, not a direct measure of it. And it is fair
to question whether that proxy is a reliable one in the context of the Muslim or Arab worlds. See
Bhala, supra note 2, at 21. But education has the virtue of being measurable in a way that wealth
or income may not be; and it is implausible to assert that it has no value as a proxy.
101. See ROBERT A. PAPE, DYING TO WIN: THE STRATEGIC LOGIC OF SUICIDE TERRORISM
211–16 (2005). For assessments of Pape’s work, see David Cook, A Critique of Robert Pape’s
Dying to Win, 30 J. STRATEGIC STUD. 243 (2007) (concluding that in general, Pape’s findings hold
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It is true, of course, that desperately poor people with little prospect of
advancement have low “opportunity costs” in turning to political violence;
and this may even be truer if they are denied any chance of seeking im-
provement through peaceful, nonviolent means.102 But Bhala is wrong to
think that this provides common sense support for the thesis that poverty
causes terrorism.103 As Krueger notes, terrorism is very unlike simple prop-
erty crimes, such as theft. Terrorism (at least of the kind al Qaeda espouses)
requires having broad opinions about the world (many of them of a fair
degree of theological and political sophistication). Those who are desper-
ately poor—unlike the middle-class—are unlikely to have the education,
the leisure, the motivation, or the access to information needed for forming
such opinions. Just as class correlates with voting—educated, middle-class
citizens with some knowledge of and concern with political issues are more
likely to vote than poorer citizens, even though the opportunity costs of
voting are higher for them—so does terrorism. “Instead of asking who has a
low salary or few opportunities,” Krueger suggests, “we should ask: Who
holds strong political views and is confident enough to try to impose their
extremist views by violent means?”104
Krueger’s analysis is supported by researchers who find that the rela-
tionship between poverty and terrorism is an inverted “U”: the poor at the
low end of the curve are too preoccupied with survival to practice terrorism,
and the rich at the opposite end are reasonably content with the status quo,
leaving those in the middle with the greatest unmet expectations and the
most keenly felt grievances. To borrow a phrase from another context, there
is “more murder in the middle.”105
Moreover, the “market” for terrorism includes both a supply side—
who offers to become a terrorist?—and a demand side—whom will terrorist
groups recruit? Terrorist groups may be more likely to select volunteers
with the education, training, and skills—like knowing how to fly a plane—
up well); Clark McCauley, Review: The Politics of Suicide Terrorism, 59 MIDDLE EAST J. 663,
663 (2005) (questioning both some of Pape’s data and his interpretations of them).
102. See Gary Becker, Terrorism and Poverty: Any Connections?, BECKER-POSNER BLOG
(May 29, 2003), http://www.becker-posner-blog.com/2005/05/terrorism-and-povertyany-connec-
tionbecker.html.
103. See Bhala, supra note 2, at 20–21.
104. KRUEGER, supra note 99, at 4.
105. See Darcy M.E. Noricks, The Root Causes of Terrorism, in SOCIAL SCIENCE FOR
COUNTERTERRORISM: PUTTING THE PIECES TOGETHER 11, 29–30, 44 (Paul K. Davis & Kim Cragin
eds., 2009) (reporting research results, and observing that “[t]here does appear to be an inverted
‘U’ relationship between terrorism and the factors of education and wealth, although that relation-
ship might be contested in terms of measurement validity.”), available at http://www.rand.org/
content/dam/rand/pubs/monographs/2009/RAND_MG849.pdf. Noricks also points out, that the
data show that “although a large percentage of al Qaeda members have some college education,
these same members are also largely unemployed or underemployed and not working in the field
for which they were educated.” Id. at 51; see also Helen Fein, More Murder in the Middle: Life
Integrity Violations and Democracy in the World, 17 HUM. RTS. Q. 170, 170 (1995) (measuring
state repressiveness as democracy is extended).
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needed to carry out complicated, high-value operations.106 Or terrorist
groups operating against a “far enemy” may choose volunteers who have
the linguistic skills or cultural knowledge to enable them to pass for locals
in the enemy’s territory. Again, we should be led to conclude that the link
between poverty and terrorism, at least on the level of individuals, is slight
or indirect.107
Finally, suicide attacks are a form of terrorism. But if the desire for
material gain motivated individuals to become terrorists, why should there
be an excess of volunteers for suicide missions?108 Furthermore, it is highly
unlikely that the poor value their lives so little that they would regard sui-
cide missions with less trepidation than the wealthier would. “[P]oor people
find their lives as worth living as anyone else. That people adjust their aspi-
rations to their circumstances so that they maintain a more or less constant
level of satisfaction is a pretty well-established psychological finding.”109
Krueger also examined the empirical data on the macro-level of socie-
ties as well as on the micro-level of individuals. Again, his findings do not
support the claim that poverty causes terrorism. Of particular relevance here
is Krueger’s conclusion as to the effect of international trade:
The volume of international trade (exports plus imports) seems to
have little effect. A higher volume of trade is associated with a
lower likelihood of a terrorist incident between a given pair of
countries. However, the results were not always statistically sig-
nificant and, most importantly, controlling for the distance be-
tween countries (because distance has a sizeable impact on the
volume of trade) tends to neutralize the effect of trade on terror-
ism. Therefore, data on the effect of trade flows might be standing
in for the distance between the countries.110
106. See Ethan Bueno de Mesquita, The Quality of Terror, 49 AM. J. POL. SCI. 515, 515–16,
523–24 (2005).
107. See KRUEGER, supra note 99, at 72–74 (discussing complications noted in de Mesquita,
supra note 106, that the selection process for high-value terrorist operations poses for Krueger’s
views). Subsequent study of these issues has led one team of researchers to find that the quality of
terrorism (i.e., the value of its targets) may be increased by unemployment (because unemploy-
ment lowers the opportunity costs of educated, skilled, experienced volunteers to joining terrorist
groups, and because such volunteers are more likely to be selected by terrorist groups and to be
successful in attacking such targets). The study focuses on local (Palestinian on Israeli) terrorism.
See Efraim Benmelech, Claude Berrebi & Esteban F. Klor, Economic Conditions and the Quality
of Suicide Terrorism (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 16320, 2010), availa-
ble at http://www.nber.org/papers/w16320.pdf.
108. KRUEGER, supra note 99, at 3–4.
109. Elster, supra note 59, at 245.
110. KRUEGER, supra note 99, at 80. Another team of researchers finds that “[t]rade openness
positively affects Islamist terrorism. . . . This suggests that Islamist attacks are in part a response
to global economic participation.” Kristopher K. Robison, Edward M. Crenshaw & J. Craig Jen-
kins, Ideologies of Violence: The Social Origins of Islamist and Leftist Transnational Terrorism,
84 SOC. FORCES 2009, 2018 (2006). But the same researchers also found that trade loses its signif-
icance for Islamist terrorism “once government consumption is controlled.” Id. at 2022. In gen-
eral, these researchers found that “urbanization and the growth of government consumption in
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Krueger’s conclusions are widely accepted by experts on terrorism.
Reviewing his work in The Wilson Quarterly, Professor Walter Reich, an
international relations theorist and terrorist expert at George Washington
University, wrote that:
[t]he belief that poverty is a root cause of Islamist terrorism has
been thoroughly discredited. Numerous studies of terrorism have
debunked the notion. Islamist terrorists themselves, as well as
those who live among them and know them well, have repeatedly
attributed Islamist terrorism primarily to religious and ideological
motivations and to the logic that—against America and the
West—terrorism is used because it works.111
Scholarly research since the publication of Krueger’s book in 2007
accords with his findings. In a review of the literature as of 2010, UCLA
Professor of Economics Michael D. Intriligator reported:
The source of terrorism is probably not poverty and igno-
rance, as is often alleged, but rather, in all likelihood, humiliation
and retribution for past actions. . . . It should be noted that the
terrorists of 9/11 were neither poor nor uneducated but rather
middle class or rich and well educated. That is similarly true of
other terrorists, including those in Europe, Asia, and Africa. Ex-
amining the common beliefs as to the underlying causes of terror-
ism, Berrebi (2009) finds that “if anything, those with higher
educational attainment and higher living standards are more likely
to participate in terrorist activity.” As to why this might be the
case, Krueger and Maleckova (2003) speculate that “well-edu-
cated individuals may participate disproportionately in terrorist
groups if they think they will assume leadership positions if they
succeed, or if they identify more strongly with the goals of the
terrorist organization than less educated individuals, or if they
live in a society where the relative pay advantages of well-edu-
cated individuals is greater for participation in terrorist organiza-
tions than in the legal sector.”
Noricks (2009) investigates the validity of many of the al-
leged root causes of terrorism and finds the only factors “likely to
be present, agreed by scholars to be important while present, and
amenable to policy influence are grievances and mobilizing struc-
tures.” As Friedman (2003) states, “The single most underap-
preciated force in international relations is humiliation.” . . .
According to Louise Richardson (2006), terrorists want “the three
combination with female labor force [participation] were uniquely relevant to Islamist attacks.
This is reinforced by the . . . religious competition between Muslims and other religions.” Id.
111. Walter Reich, The Poverty Myth, WILSON Q., Winter 2008, at 104, 104–05. Likewise, the
noted terrorism expert Walter Laqueur cited Krueger’s earlier work (among others) in concluding
that there is no demonstrated correlation between terrorism and poverty. See Walter Laqueur, The
Terrorism to Come, POL’Y REV., Aug. 1, 2004, at 49, 50–51, available at http://www.hoover.org/
publications/policy-review/article/7371.
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R’s: revenge (for perceived injustices and humiliation), renown
(the attention of the world), and reaction (disproportionate enough
to perpetuate a sense of moral outrage).112
An exhaustive 2009 RAND Corporation study of social science re-
search in a variety of disciplines on the “root causes” of terrorism is only
somewhat more guarded. It states that although “there is decided disagree-
ment on the importance of economic factors in the development of terror-
ism . . . [t]he majority opinion seems to be that poverty, at least, is not at all
predictive of terrorism.”113  And Stewart Patrick’s 2011 book on failed
states makes similar points.  Patrick observes that there is little evidence
“that poorer countries generate disproportionate numbers of terrorists.
Growth rates in the Arab Middle East have been higher than in sub-Saharan
Africa, which, despite its greater poverty, has experienced relatively little
terrorism (albeit significant violence), even in Muslim-majority
countries.”114
Finally, let me note the opinions of military experts on counter-terror-
ism as well. The Combating Terrorism Center at West Point issued a 173-
page report in September 2011 that carefully examined the conditions in
Yemen that account for the successes of AQAP, perhaps the most danger-
ous of al Qaeda’s local or regional franchises to American and other West-
ern interests. The report reflected extensive fieldwork and interviews in
Yemen. Analyzing the counter-terrorism effects of introducing major struc-
tural changes in Yemeni society, including those addressed to relieving
poverty, the report found:
[A]s normative and even strategic ends, longer-term U.S. efforts
to slow state collapse, help provide basic services and bolster the
accountability of the Yemeni government are more than justified
in Yemen. However, it remains less certain that structural reforms
are a useful tool for reducing AQAP’s capabilities to attack the
West, which have not relied on large numbers of disaffected
Yemenis. A correlation between economic deprivation and ex-
tremism must be established to justify such a policy from a
counterterrorism perspective. In Yemen this has not been demon-
strated. . . . [A]mbitious efforts to refashion Yemeni society mis-
diagnose the causes of [AQAP’s] successes. Treating Yemen’s
very real maladies is a worthy political and humanitarian aim, but
it will not diminish the threat posed by AQAP.115
112. Michael D. Intriligator, The Economics of Terrorism, 48 ECON. INQUIRY 1, 3 (2010).
113. See Noricks, supra note 105, at 27–28.
114. STEWART PATRICK, WEAK LINKS: FRAGILE STATES, GLOBAL THREATS, AND INTERNA-
TIONAL SECURITY 92 (2011).
115. See COMBATING TERRORISM CENTER, A FALSE FOUNDATION? AQAP, TRIBES AND UN-
GOVERNED SPACES IN YEMEN 149–50 (Gabriel Koehler-Derrick ed., 2011), http://www.ctc.
usma.edu/posts/a-false-foundation-aqap-tribes-and-ungoverned-spaces-in-yemen.
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In light of such broadly based and well-researched findings across a
variety of disciplines, it seems unlikely that poverty causes, or is even posi-
tively correlated with, Islamist terrorism on the micro-level. Certainly the
research does not prove such links between poverty and terrorism; and even
if one responds that it does not disprove such links, it surely justifies us in
questioning their putative existence or importance. Nor does the empirical
research appear to support the claim that the expansion of trade between
two countries in itself will reduce the incidence of terrorist attacks by na-
tionals of one of those countries against targets within the boundaries of the
other.
It seems to me, therefore, that Bhala is wrong to try to promote pas-
sage of the Doha Round by concentrating on the argument that it would
make good counter-terrorism strategy. Even if robust causal or statistical
linkages between poverty and terrorism, and between trade and counter-
terrorism, were eventually shown to exist, compelling evidence for them
has not, thus far, been produced. And there appears to be a powerful, cross-
disciplinary consensus among the leading experts on the subject that the
alleged linkages do not hold. As an argumentative strategy, “counter-terror-
ism through trade” is simply not a sound basis for defending a major for-
eign trade initiative.
Indeed, I would go further: grounding the case for the Doha Round on
such an inadequate and unconvincing theory weakens the argument for
adopting it. If the best that can be said for the Doha Round is that it is an
effective method of counter-terrorism, then we have little reason to adopt it.
The defense of Doha should be rooted instead in normative arguments and
in considerations of efficiency. If the Doha Round would contribute to rais-
ing the Islamic world (or more generally the global South) out of poverty,
that in itself is a cogent reason to endorse it. It is gratuitous, and very possi-
bly wrong, to claim that the Doha Round could or would significantly re-
duce Islamist terrorism.
I am not denying that there may be correlations or even causal links
between terrorism and various economic conditions.116 Indeed, I am in-
clined to accept Vali Nasr’s basic argument that the increasing em-
bourgoisement of the Muslim world will, over the course of several
decades, transform and pacify it. More focused theories have held, with
some empirical support, for example, that failed economic take-off induces
116. Noricks specifically allows for this possibility. See Noricks, supra note 105, at 45–46 fig.
2.1 (identifying “economic problems” such as “unemployment, poverty, stagnation and inadequate
resources” as ways in which root causes “might be connected to one another” along “multiple
possible contributing pathways”). Noricks’ overall conclusion is that “terrorism is most likely the
result when all three ‘gateway’ conditions are present: facilitative norms about violence in general
and terrorism specifically; grievances to serve as motivation; and mobilizing structures to provide
the organization.” Id. at 45.
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terrorism,117 that foreign direct investment might reduce terrorism,118 that
terrorists are motivated by fear of falling out of the ranks of the middle
class,119 or that relative economic deprivation, especially under autocratic
regimes, may be at work in causing terrorism.120 Further, it would be remiss
not to mention one social science study, Li and Schaub’s 2004 article Eco-
nomic Globalization and Transnational Terrorism, which found that to the
extent that foreign direct investment and trade together promote economic
development, they have an indirect negative effect on terrorism.121
Nonetheless, I think it is fair to say that the causal claims linking freer
trade to a lower incidence of Islamist terrorism by way of the reduction of
poverty, whether on the micro- or macro-level, are contested and unproven.
Explanations of terrorism that suggest that it might be linked in various
ways to economic underdevelopment do not in themselves show that terror-
ism is caused by poverty, let alone that it will be lessened significantly by
the growth of trade. The causal pathways leading to Islamist terrorism are
surely circuitous and intricate and the relevant explanatory factors mani-
fold. Even if the primary explanatory focus were placed on economic devel-
opment, development cannot be equated either with the growth of trade or
with the emergence of more symmetrical terms of trade: other elements of
contemporary capitalism, including the rise of local capital markets, the
penetration of global financial networks, and the quantity of foreign direct
investment, will play crucial explanatory roles as well.122 Furthermore, po-
litical, constitutional, cultural, and religious factors are indispensable ingre-
dients in any satisfactory causal explanation of terrorism, including one that
included economic factors: unless the rule of law prevails, for example,
foreign direct investment is likely to be limited. Finally, even assuming that
major structural reforms in the economies of Islamic nations could be
brought about by freer and less asymmetrical trade, and assuming further
that those reforms could yield benefits in reducing terrorism, their impact
on terrorism in the short or medium term (as the Combating Terrorism
Center at West Point noted) is much less visible.
117. See Robert Looney, Failed Economic Take-Offs and Terrorism in Pakistan: Conceptual-
izing a Proper Role for U.S. Assistance, 44 ASIAN SURV. 771, 786–89 (2004); Jennifer Bremer &
John D. Kasarda, The Origins of Terror: Implications for U.S. Foreign Policy, MILKEN INST.
REV., Dec. 2002, at 34, 35, available at http://www.milkeninstitute.org/publications/review/2002_
12/34_48mr16.pdf.
118. See Robison, Crenshaw & Jenkins, supra note 110, at 2018.
119. See Stephen Holmes, Al-Qaeda, September 11, 2001, in MAKING SENSE OF SUICIDE MIS-
SIONS, supra note 59, at 131, 143–44.
120. See Graham Bird, S. Brock Blomberg & Gregory D. Hess, International Terrorism:
Causes, Consequences and Cures, 31 WORLD ECON. 255, 259–61 (2008).
121. Quan Li & Drew Schaub, Economic Globalization and Transnational Terrorism: A
Pooled Time Series Analysis, 48 J. CONFLICT RESOL. 230, 232, 236–37, 254 (2004).
122. There is thus a parallel between the objections to the “peace through trade” thesis voiced
by Gartzke, see supra text accompanying note 27, and the objection made here to the “counterter-
rorism through trade” thesis.
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If the “counter-terrorism through trade” argument is ultimately un-
proven, what accounts for its popularity among political leaders, journalists,
and others? Let me suggest four possible explanations.
First, the explanation might have to do with the political difficulties of
building a domestic coalition to support freer trade: by claiming that the
Doha Round makes for effective counter-terrorism (a cause of universal
concern), Doha’s governmental proponents avoid having to attack the sugar
beet industry, the cotton industry, or other powerful constituencies head-
on.123 The alacrity with which some of Doha’s leading advocates seized on
a “counter-terrorism” rationale in the immediate aftermath of the 9/11 at-
tacks lends credibility to this explanation.124
A second possible explanation may be (as Krueger suggests) that by
attributing Islamist terrorism to poverty, political leaders and Western pub-
lics are enabled to avoid addressing the genuine grievances of which the
Islamists complain—notably, American foreign policy and military actions
in the Middle East. If Islamist violence stems from poverty, there seems to
be little need for searching reappraisal of, for example, the merits of the
Palestinians’ case.125
Third, critics of prevailing Western policies, no less than their defend-
ers, are drawn to insist, that poverty causes extremism. By relying on that
thesis, critics are enabled to develop a favored rhetorical strategy: that the
wealthy nations of the world, especially the United States, are themselves
squarely to blame for Islamist terrorism. By imposing discriminatory terms
of trade on the Muslim world, the argument goes, the West perpetuates and
deepens mass impoverishment there, thus breeding violent terrorism that
returns to haunt it. This kind of reasoning seems to deny or overlook that
cultural, social, or religious factors internal to the Muslim world and its
123. Appeals directed purely to the altruism of U.S. voters are unlikely to overcome the oppo-
sition to Doha from protectionist forces. Voters in liberal democracies are unlikely to act on behalf
of foreign nationals, even desperately impoverished ones, to the disadvantage of domestic constit-
uencies, unless those voters believe that such action will promote their own welfare at the same
time. See Jack L. Goldsmith, Liberal Democracy and Cosmopolitan Duty, 55 STAN. L. REV. 1667,
1675–82 (2003).
124. Leading figures in the Bush Administration began making the counter-terrorism argu-
ment in the immediate aftermath of the 9/11 attacks. For example, in a speech delivered ten days
before the opening of the World Trade Organization ministerial in Doha, then-U.S. Trade Repre-
sentative Robert Zoellick argued that “[t]he events of September 11 have set the stage for our
work. . . . By promoting the WTO’s agenda . . . these 142 nations can counter the revulsive
destructionism of terrorism.” RAYMOND J. AHEARN, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RS21657, U.S.
TRADE POLICY AND CHANGING DOMESTIC AND FOREIGN PRIORITIES: A HISTORICAL OVERVIEW 5
(2003), available at http://www.policyarchive.org/handle/10207/bitstreams/3813.pdf (quoting
Robert Zoellick).
125. See REZA ASLAN, BEYOND FUNDAMENTALISM: CONFRONTING RELIGIOUS EXTREMISM IN
THE AGE OF GLOBALIZATION 55 (2010) (“There remains today no more potent symbol of injustice
in the Muslim imagination than the suffering of Palestinians under Israeli occupation. . . . Pales-
tine has become the sole source of pan-Islamic identity in the Muslim world, the universal symbol
that . . . unites all Muslims, regardless of race, nationality, class, or piety, into . . . a single
community.”).
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traditions are likely to be significant causes of terrorism. By locating the
causes of terrorism and the other pathologies of the Muslim world in the
practices of the West, the rhetoric depicts contemporary Islamist terrorists
as the successors of an earlier generation of freedom fighters seeking to
throw off Western colonialism. Seen more as victims than as agents, con-
temporary Islamist terrorists are presented as reacting to the unjust eco-
nomic conditions imposed on them by a hostile or indifferent West.
Interestingly, these critics’ argument is the photographic negative of a cer-
tain kind of neo-conservative thinking, exemplified by Bernard Lewis’
well-known book, What Went Wrong? Islam and Modernity in the Middle
East (2002).  Lewis views the Muslim world as an arrested and wounded
civilization, trapped in its own traditional cultural patterns and religious be-
liefs, and incapable of adjusting to modernity without violence.126 No less
distorted is the picture that lays the blame for Islamist violence solely or
primarily on the West’s pursuit of its own enrichment.
For the fourth and final possible explanation, let me return to Charles
Taylor’s thoughts on the modern social imaginary. Perhaps it has simply
become difficult for us to imagine any powerful motivations other than eco-
nomic ones. We could easily grasp why young men and women would vol-
unteer to kill, or even to die, if we could find some material gains in
terrorism for them. But we find it harder to imagine that they are truly
motivated by the desire for revenge or renown or to overcome humiliation
and restore pride.127 Still less may we find it possible to imagine that they
are truly motivated by the fear, or love, of God. We are unwilling, in short,
to take the terrorists’ accounts of their motivations at their face value. To
the extent that this is so, the modern social imaginary is obscuring the truth
of things.128
126. To be sure, scholars who do not write from an American neo-conservative perspective
have reached similar conclusions about the Muslim world’s relationship to modernity. See, e.g.,
DAN DINER, LOST IN THE SACRED: WHY THE MUSLIM WORLD STOOD STILL (2009).
127. Ironically, it is economists like Krueger who have emphasized the importance of the non-
economic motives at work here.
128. Of course, modern social science is not without the conceptual resources to show that
religion can operate as an autonomous motive, rather than merely being an epiphenomenon pro-
duced by underlying economic causes. See, e.g., CHARLES TAYLOR, A SECULAR AGE 212–20
(2007). Max Weber established that proposition definitively as against Karl Marx in THE PROTES-
TANT ETHIC AND THE SPIRIT OF CAPITALISM (Talcott Parsons trans., 1930). But Weber’s insights
have been neglected, not least in connection with the study of Islamist terrorism. See MARY
HABECK, KNOWING THE ENEMY: JIHADIST IDEOLOGY AND THE WAR ON TERROR 7 (2006).
